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I. Introduction 
According to the 2009 WTO Trade Policy Review, Chile’s trade and investment regime 
is characterized by openness, transparency, and predictability.1 One of the most 
prominent features of Chile’s trade policy regime is the central role that it gives to 
Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) of which it has 23 in force with 65 trading 
partners.2 At the same time, Chile has negotiated numerous Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs) – 53 in total – providing additional protection to foreign investment 
flows. At this time, Chile is also one of the countries negotiating important regional 
agreements, such as the Transpacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) and the Pacific 
Alliance (PA). 3 
As reported by UNCTAD, in 2012 Chile was one of the top 20 economies in both 
outward and inward foreign direct investment.4 Although trade and investment 
policies have contributed to growth and poverty reduction, as reflected in Chile’s 
improvement on the UNDP Human Development Index,5 the OECD has informed that 
Chile has a high income inequality6 and had put considerable pressure on some natural 
resources, notably air quality and water availability – particularly in sectors such as 
mining, forestry and aquaculture.7  
                                                          
* Rodrigo Polanco is an Assistant Professor of International Economic Law at University of Chile and 
Ph.D. fellow and researcher at the World Trade Institute, rodrigo.polanco@wti.org. Research for this 
paper was funded by the Swiss Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) under a partnership agreement 
with the World Trade Institute of the University of Bern, Switzerland. Previous versions of this paper 
were presented at the Fourth Biennial Global Conference of the Society of International Economic Law 
(SIEL), World Trade Institute, University of Bern, Bern, July 10-12, 2014, and at the Law and Society 
Association 2015 Annual Meeting (“Law’s Promise and Law's Pathos in the Global North and Global 
South”), May 28 - 31, 2015, Seattle, United States of America. 
1
 World Trade Organization (WTO), Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review, Report by the 
Secretariat - Chile, WT/TPR/S/220. vii (Trade Policy Review), Oct. 7, 2009. 
2
 Under Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) we include Economic Complementation Agreements 
(ECAs), Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), Association Agreements (AA), Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs), Strategic Economic Partnership Agreements (SEPA) and Partial Scope Agreement (PSA).  
3
 Chile has also concluded negotiations of a Free Trade Agreement with Thailand and Hong-Kong but 
both treaties are still pending ratification by the Congress. The information about Preferential Trade 
Agreements signed and negotiated by Chile is available at the website of the Chilean Directorate 
General of International Economic Affairs (DIRECON), in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
http://www.direcon.gob.cl/. The information about International Investment Agreements signed by 
Chile is available at UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/41#iiaInnerMenu  
4
 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2013. GLOBAL 
VALUE CHAINS: INVESTMENT AND TRADE FOR DEVELOPMENT. 3, 6 (2013). 
5
 KHALID MALIK, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013: THE RISE OF THE SOUTH : HUMAN PROGRESS IN A DIVERSE 
WORLD. (United Nations Development Programme ed., 2013). 
6
 OECD, SOCIETY AT A GLANCE 2014. 110, 111 (Society at a Glance, OECD Publishing 2014). 
7
 OECD & ECLAC, OECD ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE REVIEWS: CHILE 2005. 15 (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development 2005). 
Chile has one of the largest numbers of preferential trade agreements in the world, 8 
and it is also a country with a relatively high number of International Investment 
Agreements (IIAs).9 In the following sections we will examine the main features of 
Chilean trade and investment treaties, with a special focus on development policies. 
This paper aims to analyze the main features of Chilean trade and investment treaties, 
examining if there are differences between the agreements signed by Chile and other 
“Southern” developing countries and those negotiated with “Northern” developed 
economies.10 The objective is to answer the following questions: what is the Chilean 
policy in the regulation of trade and investment flows? What are the Chilean 
regulatory priorities in trade and investment and its outcome? Which actors have been 
relevant in the design and implementation of such policies? Does this regulatory 
strategy have any relation to developmental policies? Are sustainable development, 
environmental, labor or social concerns part of Chilean South-South trade and 
investment regulations? Does Chile follow a regulatory model based on its relations 
with the United States and the European Union or has it developed its own pattern of 
regulation? 
II. Chilean Trade Agreements 
A. Historical Evolution and Main Features 
Although Chile was one of the original signatories of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) in 1947, the strategy of development of the Chilean economy at that 
time was largely based on industrialization and substitution of imports, with strong 
and varied State controls and governmental regulations on trade. Externally, it was 
expressed in a much protected economy with high tariffs and various non-tariff 
barriers, currency control and different types of exchange rates, discrimination 
between domestic and foreign investment, and with a financial system with stringent 
lending standards and differential treatment for foreign banks.11  
                                                          
8
 World Trade Organization (WTO), Trade Policy Review Body, supra note 1, at 22. 
9
 However, it is still far from the top countries in this field: Germany, China and Switzerland with 
hundreds of treaties currently in force. See:United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), International Investment Agreements by Economy (Dec. 2014), 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/IiasByCountry#iiaInnerMenu.  
10
 There are several competing terminologies on the classification of countries based on their level of 
development. This paper uses the North/South taxonomy as an analogy of the developed/developing 
country terminology, which is considered more appropriate. See: LYNGE NIELSEN, CLASSIFICATIONS OF 
COUNTRIES BASED ON THEIR LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT: HOW IT IS DONE AND HOW IT COULD BE DONE (International 
Monetary Fund 2011). For a classification of countries based on The World Bank, Countries and 
Economies, DATA (2015), http://data.worldbank.org/country. 
11
 DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS (DIRECON), CHILE 20 AÑOS DE NEGOCIACIONES 
COMERCIALES. 58 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile 2009). 
In 1969, Chile was one of the founding members of the Andean Common Market 
(ANCOM or Andean Group),12 an effort to liberalize regional trade, establishing wide 
common economic policies including the treatment of foreign capital, a common 
external tariff and joint industrial planning.13 Few years after the military intervention 
of 1973, Chile unilaterally changed its trade and investment policy, moving from 
substitution of imports to the promotion of exports, liberalizing the domestic financial 
system, granting national treatment to foreign investors, and unilaterally adopting a 
standard reduction of tariffs.14  
This radical policy change, led Chile to a withdrawal from the Andean Group in 1976, as 
there were conflicting positions on common external tariffs15 and on the treatment of 
foreign investment.16 At the time, the commercial exchange with countries of the 
Andean Group favored by preferential tariffs was below 1.8% of the total trade of 
Chile.17 In the late 80’s the country implemented an export-led growth strategy 
focused on agriculture, instead exclusively on extractive industries.18 
With the return of democracy in 1990, Chile prioritized a global re-insertion at the 
international community and the world economy, starting at a regional level. Under 
the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA/ALADI),19 Chile negotiated “Economic 
                                                          
12
 The Andean Group was created by the Cartagena Agreement signed on May 26, 1969 by five Latin 
American countries: Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru. Venezuela later joined the Group in 
1973. 
13
 William P. Avery, The Politics of Crisis and Cooperation in the Andean Group, 17 THE JOURNAL OF 
DEVELOPING AREAS 155, 155 (1983). 
14
 DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS (DIRECON), supra note 11, at 58–59.  
15
 ANCOM member States had accepted a reduction of Chilean tariffs only up to 60%. Between 1975 and 
1979, Chile eliminated all exchange controls and quantitative restrictions, and reduced import tariffs to 
a uniform 10% (from an average in excess of 100%). Although in 1983-1983 tariffs were temporarily 
raised up to 35% (the maximum as a “bound” tariff under GATT) after a severe economic crisis, they 
were then periodically reduced to 11% by 1991. Sebastian Edwards & Daniel Lederman, The Political 
Economy of Unilateral Trade Liberalization: The Case of Chile, NBER Working Paper No. 6510 4–9 (1998). 
16
 The new Chilean Statute of Foreign Investment (DL 600 of 1974) granting national treatment to 
foreign investors clashed with ANCOM Decision 24 (“Andean Foreign Investment Code”), which 
established a common framework of controlling foreign investment in the region, that included the 
divest of ownership and control in several multinational companies, the limitation of net profits and 
provisions regulating the transfer of technology. William P. Avery, supra note 13, at 159–60. For an 
analysis of the Decision 24, see: Frederick M. Abbott, Bargaining Power and Strategy in the Foreign 
Investment Process: A Current Andean Code Analysis, 3 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 319 (1975). 
17
 DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS (DIRECON), supra note 11, at 43. 
18
 MARIA ELENA VARAS, EXPORT GROWTH AND DIVERSIFICATION: A POLICY ANALYSIS FOR THE CASE OF CHILE 3 (2012). 
19
 ALADI is the largest Latin American integration effort. Its thirteen member countries include 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela, together representing 20 million square kilometers and more than 510 million inhabitants. 
Its constitutive and regulatory comprehensive legal framework is given by the Treaty of Montevideo 
signed on August 12, 1980. ALADI followed a previous failed attempt of economic integration – the Latin 
American Free Trade Association (LAFTA / ALALC) founded in 1960 by the Treaty of Montevideo signed 
on February 18, 1960. However, ALADI’s success was only partial and it was affected by the collapse of 
many Latin American economies during the 1980 debt crisis. Karl Kaltenthaler & Frank O. Mora, 
Complementation Agreements” (ECAs), with countries of the region which allowed 
most of the Chilean trade with ALADI’s countries to continue without tariffs.20 Chile 
signed the first ECA with Argentina21 in 1991, followed by similar agreements with 
Mexico in 1991; Colombia, Venezuela and Bolivia in 1993; Ecuador in 1994 and 200822; 
Peru in 1998;23 and Cuba in 1999.24  
In 1996, Chile entered into an ECA with MERCOSUR,25 but without becoming a full 
member of that customs union, considering that MERCOUR had a different 
international strategy with higher tariffs and several protectionist measures for State 
members.26 
By mid-1990’s, Chile implemented a policy of “open regionalism”27 and it started trade 
negotiations with non-ALADI members, aiming to reconcile regional integration with 
globalization. This strategy has also been labeled as “additive regionalism”, a process 
defined as sequentially negotiating bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with all 
major trading partners,28 enabling the preferential entry of Chilean goods and services 
into those countries. These agreements were more “comprehensive” than the ECAs 
and generally included broad aspects of the bilateral economic relationship, such as 
trade in goods, investment promotion and protection, cross-border services, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Explaining Latin American Economic Integration: The Case of Mercosur, 9 REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 72, 72–73 (2002). 
20
 DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS (DIRECON), supra note 11, at 70. 
21
 Id. at 75–78. 
22
 Id. at 78–84, 91–96. The ECA N° 32 with Ecuador entered into force on January 1, 1995 and in 2008 it 
was replaced by the ECA N°65 which entered into force on January 25, 2010. 
23
 Id. at 118–21. 
24
 Id. at 123. 
25
 MERCOSUR is a customs union established in 1991 by the Treaty of Asunción between Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela (since 2012). Bolivia is currently in the process of becoming a 
member after signing an accession protocol in December 2012. Although the agreement with 
MERCOSUR is formally an ECA it has the characteristics of a Free Trade Agreement. 
26
 DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS (DIRECON), supra note 11, at 96–118. See also 
Joaquín Fermandois & María José Henríquez Uzal, ¿Contradicción O Díada? Política Exterior De Chile 
Ante El Mercosur, 38 ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES (2011). This agreement also implied the absorption of the 
ACE with Argentina with some exceptions (energy, for example). 
27
 The concept of “open regionalism” was introduced at APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) 
meetings in the mid-1990’s, without a uniformly agreed definition. It has been defined as the “external 
liberalization by trade blocs, that is, the reduction in barriers on imports from non-member countries 
that is undertaken when member countries liberalize the trade among themselves. The degree of 
liberalization on imports from non-members need not be as high as that for member countries”. Shang-
Jin Wei & Jeffrey A. Frankel, Open Regionalism in a World of Continental Trade Blocs, STAFF PAPERS VOL 45 
NO 3 (SEPTEMBER 1998) 440, 441 (1998). 
28
 Glenn W. Harrison et al., Chile’s Regional Arrangements and the Free Trade Agreement of the 
Americas: The Importance of Market Access., in 9 GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS FOR THE CHILEAN ECONOMY 
303, 303 (Rómulo A. Chumacero et al. eds., Central Bank Of Chile, 1st ed. 2005). 
protection of intellectual property rights, and further facilitating of access to products 
on the market, among other matters.29  
In December 1994, Chile was invited to start negotiations to join the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 30 a process that did not succeed as the Clinton 
Administration was unable to obtain a special mandate to negotiate on behalf of the 
United States Congress ("fast track").31 This led Chile to adopt a new strategy: 
negotiating separate FTAs with each NAFTA member. 32 Thus, in December 1996, Chile 
entered into an FTA with Canada and in 1998 with Mexico. After lengthy negotiations, 
Chile finally signed an FTA with the United States in June 2003, which entered into 
force on January 1, 2004. 
In 1998, the governments of Chile and several Central American countries announced 
their intent to negotiate an FTA. The agreement signed in 1999, consists of a common 
set of disciplines with bilateral protocols negotiated successively between Chile and 
each Central American country: Costa Rica (1999), El Salvador (2000), Honduras (2008), 
Guatemala (2010) and Nicaragua (2012).33 In 2006, the ECAs with Peru and Colombia 
were expanded and replaced by separate FTAs with both countries that entered into 
force in 2009.  
Complementing the negotiations with Latin American countries, an FTA was signed 
between Chile and Panama in 2008 – the first one of that country with a South 
American State – and in 2011 started the negotiation of a further economic and 
commercial integration with Colombia, Mexico and Peru, through the “Pacific Alliance” 
(PA). The Pacific Alliance was established in April 2011, and formalized by a Framework 
Agreement signed in Paranal, Chile on June 6, 2012.34 Current members are Chile, 
Colombia, Peru and Mexico. This is the first regional trade agreement that Chile has 
concluded after leaving the Andean Community in 1976. Costa Rica is finishing up the 
process to be incorporated as the Alliance's fifth member,35 and Panama is also a 
candidate for joining the bloc.36 
                                                          
29
 DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS (DIRECON), supra note 11, at 70. 
30
 NAFTA is a free trade agreement between Canada, Mexico and the United States, that was signed in 
San Antonio, Texas on December 17, 1992, and came into force on January 1, 1994. 
31
 Felipe Larraín, América Latina a Las Puertas Del Siglo XXI: Hacia Una Asociación Transpacífica, in 
AMÉRICA LATINA Y ASIA-PACÍFICO : OPORTUNIDADES ANTE LA CRISIS 379 (Pilar Alamos et al. eds., Colección de 
Estudios Internacionales, Instituto de Estudios Internacionales, Universidad de Chile, 1st ed. 1998). 
32
 DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS (DIRECON), supra note 11, at 66. 
33
 Organization of American States, SICE: Trade Policy Developments: Central America - Chile, SICE - 
FOREIGN TRADE INFORMATION SYSTEM, http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/CACM_CHL/CACM_CHL_e.ASP. 
34
 The Framework Agreement of the Pacific Alliance was signed between Chile, Colombia, Mexico and 
Peru on June 6, 2012. Organization of American States (OAS), Foreign Trade Information System, Pacific 
Alliance, TRADE POLICY DEVELOPMENTS (Jun. 20, 2014), 
http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/Pacific_Alliance/Pacific_Alliance_e.asp. 
35
 In February 2014, Costa Rica signed a declaration which establishes its roadmap to become a full 
member of the Alliance including the requirement to have FTAs with each of the member countries. 
In 2002, Chile signed an Association Agreement (AA) with the European Union, with 
substantial differences from other international economic agreements that Chile was 
signing at that time, as the treaty includes political, economic and cooperation 
provisions in a wide range of activities.37  
The following year, Chile concluded FTAs with Korea and the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA), both signed in 2003.38 Both treaties entered into force in 2004. 
During the same time negotiations with Turkey were started, although an FTA was 
signed only in 2009 and entered into force on March 2011. 
On November 18, 2005, an FTA was signed between Chile and China, the first 
agreement of this kind with a Latin American country. After the FTA entered into force, 
China became the main destination for Chilean exports – moving the United States into 
second place – and doubling the number of exports before the agreement.39 The Chile-
China FTA initially did not include investment provisions, but an investment chapter 
was concluded in September 2012 after a couple of years of negotiation and entered 
into force in February 2014. 
Also in 2005, Chile became part of a regional PTA with other countries of Asia-Pacific: 
the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (SEPA) – also known as 
“P4” – including New Zealand, Singapore and Brunei Darussalam, in force since 2006. 
The expansion of this agreement has been the basis of the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP), currently being negotiated.40  
The following years, Chile actively concluded a series of trade agreements with 
countries of the Asia-Pacific region. In 2006, a Partial Scope Agreement (PSA) was 
signed with India and its expansion is currently being negotiated.41 In 2007, a Strategic 
Economic Partnership (SEP) was signed between Chile and Japan and subsequent FTAs 
were signed by Chile with Australia (2008), Malaysia (2010), and Vietnam (2011), all of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Costa Rica currently has FTAs in force with Chile, Mexico and Peru, and has signed an FTA with Colombia 
that is pending approval. M. Angeles Villarreal, The Pacific Alliance: A Trade Integration Initiative in Latin 
America, R43748 3 (Congressional Research Service), Oct. 2, 2014. 
36
 Panama has free trade agreements in force with Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica and has an agreement 
with Colombia that was signed in September 2013 and is awaiting approval. Panama has also initiated 
FTA negotiations with Mexico. Id. 
37
 DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS (DIRECON), supra note 11, at 154. 
38
 European Free Trade Association (EFTA) includes Switzerland, Liechtenstein Norway and Iceland. 
39
 ECLAC, Aspectos Destacados De La 
Econom{"citationID":"eQxfQfVf","properties":{"formattedCitation":"{\\rtf ECL 21 (2011). 
40
 For a detailed account of these negotiations, see: TRADE LIBERALISATION AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION: 
A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (Tania Voon ed., Edward Elgar Pub 2014). 
41
 This is the first trade agreement of India with an individual Latin American country, although it has a 
preferential trade agreement with MERCOSUR in force since 2009.DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS (DIRECON), supra note 11, at 179–80. 
them currently in force. Two other FTAs were signed in 2012 – with Thailand and 
Hong-Kong – but approval of the Chilean Congress is still pending.  
These agreements have strengthened the will of Chile to reduce trade barriers through 
negotiations on preferential agreements, privileging the eligible countries for its 
exports. DIRECON reported that in 2012, Chile reached 62% of the world population 
and 93% of Chilean exports are to countries which have trade preferences.42 Today, 
Chile’s weighted mean applied tariff is below 3%.43 Chile’s strategy of an active 
network of bilateral agreements, with a strong multilateral engagement and the 
progressive adoption of unilateral measures, has allowed the country to execute a free 
and coherent trade policy, without being part of any regional integration scheme.44  
If we analyze the 23 PTAs signed by Chile that are currently in force, we can see an 
evolution from Economic Complementation Agreements (ECAs), which mainly covered 
the liberalization of trade in goods, and in some cases other aspects of integration,45 to 
broader preferential trade agreements, mostly under the form of Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs) that provide not only for elimination of tariffs in the trade of 
goods46 and traditional disciplines (market access, rules of origin, customs procedures, 
technical regulations, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and trade defense 
measures), but also broad scope provisions on other issues such as intellectual 
property, trade in services, competition policy,47 government procurement, 
transparency, dispute settlement48 and investment. 49 Exceptions considered in those 
                                                          
42
 Francisco Rivera von Hagen et al., Los Servicios De Tecnologías De Información En Chile, presented at 
Deslocalización De Servicios Y Cadenas Globales De Valor: ¿Nuevos Factores De Cambios Estructurales 
En América Latina Y El Caribe? 3 (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 
Santiago, Chile 2012). 
43
 “Weighted mean applied tariff” is the average of effectively applied rates weighted by the product 
import shares corresponding to each country. The World Bank, Tariff rate, applied, weighted mean, 
primary products (%), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TM.TAX.TCOM.WM.AR.ZS/countries/1W-
CL?display=graph. 
44
 Renata Vargas Amaral & Thalis Ryan de Andrade, Las relaciones comerciales de América Latina: 
integraciones económicas regionales y análisis de la proliferación de acuerdos con los EE.UU.  183–84 
(2008). 
45
 DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS (DIRECON), supra note 11, at 70. Some PTAs 
include other aspects like physical integration (FTA with MERCOSUR) or energy integration (ACE with 
Bolivia). 
46
 In the vast majority of cases, the bulk of tariff lines were liberalized when the FTA entered into force 
or else during its first years. When timetables are scheduled for complete elimination of tariffs, its 
duration varies between 6 to 18 years. Products excluded from tariff reduction also vary between FTAs, 
but generally relate to agricultural products (wheat, wheat flour and sugar), and some chemicals, 
minerals, wood, footwear, electrical appliances, textiles and clothing. World Trade Organization (WTO), 
Trade Policy Review Body, supra note 1, at 22. 
47
 All Chilean PTAs have special provisions on antidumping, with the sole exception of the SEP with 
Japan. The big majority have explicit sections on competition policy, with the exception of the ECAs with 
Cuba and Ecuador, the FTAs with China, Panama, Turkey, Malaysia, Vietnam and the PSA with India. 
48
 Almost all Chilean PTAs have a chapter on dispute settlement, with the sole exception of the ECA with 
Venezuela. 
PTAs usually include national security, taxation, disclosure of information, and balance 
of payments. 50 A significant number of Chilean PTAs also include general exceptions 
based on GATT Art. XX.51 Newer Chilean PTAs are generally more complex and broader 
than the ones signed in the 90’s. 
B. Variations According to the Level of Development of Treaty 
Partners 
In the majority of the Chilean trade agreements there are no major differences 
between the PTAs signed by Chile with other “Southern” developing countries and 
those negotiated with “Northern” developed economies.52  
Generally, differences do not seem to follow the developed/developing divide. For 
example, this is the case of provisions on anti-dumping measures, agricultural 
subsidies, trade facilitation, and transparency. 
On the issue of anti-dumping measures, several Chilean PTAs merely refer to the WTO 
law53 (FTAs with China, Malaysia, Turkey, the United States, Vietnam and the P4 SEPA), 
whereas others provide for the non-application or elimination of such measures (FTAs 
with Canada and EFTA), or do not address this issue at all (EPA with Japan).54   
With regard to subsidies, several PTAs signed by Chile provide for the non-application 
of agricultural export subsidies (FTAs with Australia, Canada, China, Colombia, Mexico, 
Panama, the United States and the P4 EPA), whereas others have no reference to this 
issue (the AA with the European Community and FTAs with Central America and 
Turkey), 55 or declare as a common objective the multilateral elimination of export 
subsidies for agricultural goods, restating the application of the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture (FTA with Malaysia)56 or the Doha Ministerial Declaration and the Decision 
Adopted by the WTO General Council of  August 1, 2004 (PSA with India).57 
                                                                                                                                                                          
49
 World Trade Organization (WTO), Trade Policy Review Body, supra note 1, at 22. The chapters on 
investment will be analyzed in the next section. 
50
 Only the Chile-Canada FTA includes an exception on cultural industries (Annex O-06).  
51
 General exceptions are included in the FTAs with the United States, Central America, China, Peru, 
Colombia, Turkey, Malaysia and Vietnam, in the PSA with India, the SEP with Japan, the SEPA P4, and the 
ECA with Ecuador. 
52
 From the 23 agreements currently in force seven are with Northern developed countries or trading 
blocs (Canada, European Union, United States, EFTA, P4, Japan and Australia) and 16 with Southern 
developing countries or trading blocs (Venezuela, Bolivia, MERCOSUR, Mexico, Central America, Cuba, 
Korea, China, India, Panama, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, Turkey, Malaysia and Vietnam).  
53
 Article VI of GATT 1994, the WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 and 
the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 
54
 World Trade Organization (WTO), Trade Policy Review Body, supra note 1, at 23. 
55
 Id. 
56
 Chile-Malaysia FTA, Art. 3.10. 
57
 Chile-India PSA, Art. IX. 
Explicit provisions on trade facilitation are found only in 11 of 23 Chilean PTAs, and 
three of them are signed with developed countries (the FTA with United States and 
Australia, and the SEPA P4)58 and eight with developing economies (the FTAs with 
China, Panama, Peru, Colombia, Turkey, Malaysia and Vietnam, and the ECA with 
Ecuador).59  
The big majority of the Chilean PTAs include a special chapter on transparency.60 
Although a special section on transparency is not considered in the ECAs with Bolivia, 
Cuba and Venezuela, in the FTA with MERCOSUR and in the PSA with India, this seems 
to be related to the fact that discipline was usually not present in older trade 
agreements.  
However, we do find key differences in Chilean PTAs that seems to be based on the 
“developed” or “developing” status of the trading partner. Some examples are those 
related to market access in the trade of goods, government procurement, intellectual 
property, electronic commerce and in the regulation of trade in specific services.  
Market access on goods is generally considered in PTAs with developed countries, 
although binding commitments are only implicit in the PTAs with Japan, the P4 and the 
EU, even if the future negotiation on the improvement of market access conditions on 
originating goods is considered.61 Similarly, there are no plain market access 
commitments in the ECAs with Venezuela and Bolivia, in the PSA with India, and in the 
FTAs with MERCOSUR, Peru, Colombia, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Therefore, the North-
South PTAs generally provide sufficient access to make them beneficial, but the South-
South agreements do not.62 
All the PTAs signed by Chile with developed countries, include a chapter on 
government procurement.63 On the contrary, only the FTAs with Mexico, Central 
America, Colombia and Korea, include provisions on procurement of goods and 
services on behalf of a public authority.64  
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Similarly, almost all Chilean PTAs with developed countries include a chapter on 
intellectual property.65 The sole exception is the FTA with Canada. Conversely, only 
half of the Chilean PTAs with developing countries have provisions on intellectual 
property: the ECA with Cuba,66 and the FTAs with MERCOSUR, Mexico, Korea, and 
Turkey.67 The Chile-China FTA only has a provision on cooperation on intellectual 
property rights,68 and the FTA Chile-Peru a generic commitment to the defense of 
those rights insofar as they do not constitute unjustified obstacles to bilateral trade.69  
Although Chilean PTAs do not generally have provisions on electric commerce, we 
found a chapter on e-commerce in the PTAs with the United States and Australia, and 
special provisions in the AA with the European Union.70 With developing countries, 
only the FTA with Colombia has a chapter on electronic commerce.71 
Not every PTA signed by Chile has a chapter on trade in services,72 but all the 
agreements signed with developed countries include one. As for developing countries, 
ECAs often do not consider a chapter on services except for partial commitments in air 
and maritime transportation (ECAs with Venezuela, Cuba and Ecuador), and the FTAs 
with Turkey, Malaysia and Vietnam do not have an investment chapter (although they 
include an “evolutionary clause” providing for future exploratory talks on trade in 
services).73 The PSA with India also does not have an investment chapter, although 
negotiations to expand it are currently taking place.74 
When available, in general Chilean PTAs contain the usual provisions on trade in 
services, such as market access, non-discrimination (national treatment and most-
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favored nation treatment), local presence, denial of benefits, non-conforming 
measures and reservations. 75 With respect to specific services, most of the Chilean 
PTAs have chapters or annexes with provisions on telecommunications, professional 
services and temporary entry for business persons. However, this is not true of 
financial services76 or air transportation.   
In the case of telecommunications, all PTAs with developed countries include a chapter 
on those services, with the sole exception of the SEP with Japan and the P4 SEPA. 
Conversely, the big majority of PTAs with developing countries do not include a 
telecommunications chapter, with the sole exception of the FTAs with Korea and 
Central America.77 
On the subject of professional services, the situation is different. The big majority of 
PTAs with both developed and developing countries include provisions with soft 
commitments to facilitate the recognition of the qualifications and/or 
registration/licensing of professionals, and to encourage the development of 
procedures for the temporary licensing of professional service providers.78 Treaties 
without these provisions include mostly developing countries, like the ECAs with 
Venezuela, Cuba and Ecuador and the FTA with China. The EPA with Japan also does 
not include them. 
The differences arise again with respect to the temporary entry of business persons. 
With developed countries, only the AA with the European Union and the FTA with 
EFTA do not have provisions in this regard. As for developing countries, only the 
Chilean FTAs with Central America, China, Korea, MERCOSUR, Mexico, Peru and the 
ECA with Ecuador have explicit provisions on this issue.79 However, the business 
persons from Malaysia and Vietnam could benefit from a separate agreement for Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries,80 and the ones from Colombia from a 
separate agreement for tourists.81 
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Several Chilean PTAs contain chapters on financial services (the ECA with Japan, the AA 
with the European Community, and the FTAs with Australia and the United States), 
while others call for future negotiations to include such services (the FTAs with 
Canada, China, Colombia, EFTA, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Vietnam and the P4 
SEPA), and few expressly exclude this discipline (like the FTA with Central America).82 
In other cases, trade in services is not yet part of the FTA (the Agreements with 
Malaysia, Turkey and Vietnam). 
In the case of air transportation, although generally excluded from Chilean PTAs, there 
are several side agreements concluded with both developed and developing countries. 
In the case of Northern countries, only Japan does not have a special Air Transport 
Agreement, and in the case of Southern countries, such agreements are not available 
with respect to Colombia, Cuba, India, Turkey, Venezuela and Vietnam.83 
III. Chilean Foreign Investment Treaties 
A. Historical Evolution and Main Features 
By the end of the 1980’s and early 1990’s, many developing countries in Asia, Africa 
and Latin America had entered into several bilateral investment treaties (BITs),84 with 
the aim of stimulating economic growth through foreign direct investment (FDI).85  At 
the same time, a number of these countries privatized State-owned enterprises – 
including their energy and utility companies, in order to become an attractive location 
to potential foreign investors.86 Chile was a leading country on both processes in Latin 
America. 
Although initially BITs were concluded in small numbers between a developing and a 
developed country, usually at the initiative of the latter,87 this pattern changed with 
the increasing integration of the world economy and trade liberalization. In the 1990s, 
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economies in transition and developing countries started signing BITs among 
themselves and in large numbers.88  
Basic features of most BITs include the scope of coverage (definition of foreign 
investment and foreign investor), standards of treatment (including most-favored-
nation clauses, national treatment, fair and equitable treatment, full protection and 
security), standards of protection (guarantees and compensation in respect of 
expropriation, warranties of free transfer of funds, capital and profits, subrogation on 
insurance claims), and dispute settlement provisions (Investor-State and State-to-State 
arbitration).89 
In that context, Chile signed 53 BITs with the aim of promoting and protecting foreign 
investment. The majority of them were signed with European and Latin-American 
countries. With Europe, Chile has signed 22 BITs:90 with Spain (1991), Germany (1991), 
France (1992), Belgium/Luxembourg (1992), Italy (1993), Sweden (1993), Finland 
(1993), Denmark (1993), Norway (1993), Croatia (1994), Czech Republic (1995), 
Portugal (1995), Romania (1995), Poland (1995), Ukraine (1995), United Kingdom 
(1996), Greece (1996), Hungary (1997), Austria (1997), Netherlands (1998), Switzerland 
(1999), and Iceland (2003). 
With Latin-American countries, Chile has signed 18 BITs:91 with Argentina (1991), 
Venezuela (1993), Ecuador (1993), Brazil (1994), Bolivia (1994), Paraguay (1995), 
Uruguay (1995, 201092), Cuba (1996), Costa Rica (1996), El Salvador (1996), Guatemala 
(1996), Nicaragua (1996), Panama (1996), Honduras (1996), Colombia (2000), Peru 
(2000), and Dominican Republic (2000).  
Chile has signed 13 more BITs with countries in other regions of the world: 93 with 
Turkey (1998), Tunisia (1998), South Africa (1998), Malaysia (1992), China (1994), 
Philippines (1995), Korea (1996), Indonesia (1999), Vietnam (1999), Egypt (1999), 
Lebanon (1999), Australia (1996), and New Zealand (1999).  
In 1992, Chapter 11 of NAFTA became the first treaty regulating foreign investment 
that included two developed countries (Canada and the United States).94 Following 
that example,  investment chapters began to be included in certain FTAs. Although 
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Chile has a large number of BITs in force, without considering the renegotiation of the 
BIT with Uruguay in 2010, Chile has not negotiated this type of agreement in more 
than ten years (the latest was the BIT signed with Iceland in 2003) opting to include 
investment disciplines in most of PTAs it has signed.95 
Today, Chile has 9 PTAs in force with an investment chapter: the ones signed with 
Canada (1996), Mexico (1998), Korea (2003), United States (2003), Colombia (2006), 
Peru (2006), Japan (2007), Australia (2008), and China (2012). FTAs with the EU, EFTA, 
MERCOSUR, Central America and Panama do not include a separate investment 
chapter, but they refer to previous BITs signed by Chile with those parties. The FTAs 
with Hong-Kong (2012) and Thailand (2013) also do not include investment chapters, 
although the FTA with Thailand has a provision that leave open the possibility of 
negotiating such chapter in the future.96 
In general, these investment chapters include disciplines on sector liberalization 
(through negative lists), national treatment, most-favored nation treatment, minimum 
standards of treatment, performance requirements, free transfers of capital, 
expropriation and compensation, and dispute settlement (including Investor-State 
arbitration). 97 
In February 2014, Chile, together with the other three countries that formed the 
Pacific Alliance in 2011 (Colombia, Mexico and Peru) signed a protocol that includes a 
chapter on investment with substantive and procedural investment protection 
standards, similar to the ones included in BITs.98 This protocol has yet to be ratified. 
From the 53 abovementioned Chilean BITs, only 36 are in force, as eleven have not 
completed its ratification process (the ones with Brazil, Egypt, Hungary, Indonesia, 
Lebanon, Netherlands, New Zealand, South Africa, Tunisia, Turkey, and Vietnam), five 
have been replaced by an investment chapter within an FTA (the BITs with Australia, 
Colombia,99 China, Korea and Peru), and one has been replaced by another BIT (the 
one with Uruguay). If we add to that the 9 investment chapters in PTAs, 45 is the total 
number of IIAs100 signed by Chile, that are currently in force.  
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B. Variations According to the Level of Development of Treaty 
Partners 
IIAs signed by Chile have two different patterns. When negotiated as standalone 
treaties, they mostly follow the classical structure of a BIT, as “Agreements on the 
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments”. When included in PTAs, they 
constitute one of the chapters of the agreement, usually next to the section on cross-
border trade in services.101 
53 Chilean BITs were signed from 1991 to 2003, closely following the “Dutch gold 
standard model BIT”, as short treaties with broad definitions for investors and 
investment; unqualified Most-Favored Nation (MFN), National Treatment (NT), and 
Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET); free transfer of funds in connection with an 
investment; no exceptions for special sectors; Investor-State Arbitration (ISA); no filter 
mechanisms for taxation measures; and, full compensation for direct and indirect 
expropriation, these being the main features of the Dutch BITs, as characterized by 
Lavranos.102 However, the “Chilean Model BIT” of 1994,103 has neither provisions on 
“full protection and security” (FPS),104 nor an umbrella clause, and few Chilean BITs 
have included those.105    
As mentioned, since 2003 Chile has not signed new BITs, with the sole exception of the 
treaty with Uruguay in 2010 that replaced a previous agreement of 1995. Today, all the 
new Chilean IIAs are found as investment chapters in PTAs, the first being the one 
signed with Canada in 1996, followed by the PTAs signed with Mexico,  Korea, United 
States, Colombia, Peru, Japan, Australia and a recent supplementary agreement on 
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investment with China (2012). The Chilean Investment Chapters closely follow an 
updated “NAFTA Model”, being longer and complex texts, with detailed definitions, 
notably on the scope of fair and equitable treatment,106 expropriation (particularly 
indirect expropriation),107 and the definition of investment the definition of investment 
(is less broad and subject to certain objective criteria – risk capital commitment, 
utilities, duration).108 These chapters also include provisions on performance 
requirements, full protection and security, filter mechanisms and carve-outs for certain 
sectors like financial services, transparency rules, and provisions on sustainability, 
environment and labor.109 The 2010 Chile-Uruguay BIT also follows this model. 
Another major difference is that previous Chilean BITs provide no admission and 
establishment rights, and protection is only given after the entry to the foreign 
investment, being admission largely depending on the national law of the host State.110 
Conversely, almost all the Investment Chapters of the PTAs signed by Chile include pre-
establishment rules, national and most-favored nation treatment regarding admission 
and establishment, subject to a series of exceptions.111 The only exception is the 
Supplementary Investment Agreement with China, which does not include pre-entry 
rights. 
By contrast, the investment disciplines in other PTAs signed by Chile with countries 
members of the European Community, EFTA, and MERCOSUR, as well as with Central 
American nations and Panama, are mostly restricted to granting national treatment to 
the establishment of investors of the other party in designated sectors, although their 
scope is increased by the protection given by previous bilateral investment treaties 
signed by Chile with those countries.112 
However, both Chilean BITs and investment chapters in PTAs share some features. 
They all include national treatment, MFN treatment, fair and equitable/minimum 
standard of treatment, subrogation, expropriation and compensation for 
expropriation, among others.113  
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Also as a general rule, in all Chilean IIAs, investment is protected only if it is carried out 
in accordance with the treaty and the law of the host country. In this regard the use of 
Formal Exchange (FEM) for incoming capital and for acquiring the currency to remit 
capital or profits is mandatory for most foreign investment.114 
All IIAs signed by Chile include ISA as a dispute settlement mechanism for claims 
arising between a Contracting Party and an investor of the other Contracting Party. 
Before resorting to ISA, these disputes shall, to the extent possible, be settled through 
amicable consultation or negotiation between the parties. Only if amicable 
consultations cannot settle the dispute within three to six months,115 the investor can 
choose between submitting the claim to the domestic jurisdiction of the host State or 
to international arbitration. In almost all cases, this choice is deemed definitive and 
exclusive, and recourse to local courts precludes the use of ISA and vice versa.116  
When the choice of international arbitration is made, as a general rule, the investor 
must choose among the institutional arbitration of the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”), or an ad hoc arbitration under the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) arbitration rules. 117 
                                                          
114
 Rodrigo Polanco Lazo, supra note 90, at 224. 
115
 A minimum of 3 months consultation prior to arbitration is required in the BITs signed with Malaysia,  
Ukraine, Romania, Czech Republic, United Kingdom, Poland, Paraguay, Panama, Nicaragua, Honduras, 
Guatemala, Greece, Philippines, El Salvador, Cuba, Croatia, Austria, Egypt, Indonesia, Netherlands, South 
Africa and Turkey. A minimum of 4 months consultation prior to arbitration is required in the BITs signed 
with Dominican Republic, Tunisia and Vietnam. A minimum of 5 months consultation prior to arbitration 
is required in the BITs signed with Lebanon, Hungary and Costa Rica. A minimum of 6 months 
consultation prior to arbitration is required in the BITs signed with Argentina, Spain, Germany, 
Switzerland, France, Belgium/Luxembourg, Venezuela, Sweden, Portugal, Norway, Italy, Finland, 
Ecuador, Denmark, Brazil, Bolivia, New Zealand, Iceland and Uruguay. All investment chapters in Chilean 
PTAs consider a minimum of 6 months consultation prior to arbitration. 
116
 According to this principle (often called “fork-in-the-road”), the election made by the investor of 
either international arbitration or domestic courts is deemed to be final. However, the efficacy of this 
provision is relative, as consistent case law in investment arbitration has deemed it applicable only if the 
same dispute between the same parties has been submitted to domestic courts or administrative 
tribunals of the host State, before the resort to international arbitration. Plus, not every exercise of 
domestic procedural rights, would trigger these provisions, as several IIAs include redress through 
domestic courts or administrative tribunals as guarantees of effective domestic remedies. Christoph 
Schreuer, Traveling the BIT Route: Of Waiting Periods, Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the Road, 5 JOURNAL 
OF WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 231, 247–49 (2004). 
117
 In the great majority of BITs signed by Chile, only ICSID Arbitration Rules are applicable. This happens 
in the agreements with Germany, Belgium/Luxembourg, Malaysia, Venezuela, Ukraine, Sweden, 
Romania, United Kingdom, Portugal, Paraguay, Panama, Norway, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, 
Finland, Philippines, El Salvador, Ecuador, Denmark, Croatia, Costa Rica, Bolivia, Indonesia, Egypt, Tunisia 
and Holland. In a significant group of treaties, there is a choice of either ICSID or UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules: Argentine, Spain, France, Uruguay, Czech Republic, Poland, Italy, Hungary, Greece, Brazil, Austria, 
Vietnam, Lebanon, New Zealand, Turkey, Dominican Republic, South Africa and Iceland. In only one 
treaty, ICSID is not considered as a choice of international arbitration: in the BIT with Cuba where 
investor can opt for ad hoc arbitration under the rules of the same agreement or under UNCITRAL 
Arbitration. All investment chapters in PTAs signed by Chile consider a choice of international arbitration 
between ICSID Arbitration Rules (including its Additional Facility) and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The 
In the majority of the BITs signed by Chile, once a dispute has been submitted to a 
domestic court or international arbitration, the recourse to diplomatic protection to 
settle the dispute is excluded, unless the other Contracting Party has failed to abide or 
comply with any judgment, award, order or other determination made by the 
competent international or local tribunal in question.118 This prohibition is considered 
in all the Chilean BITs, with the notable exceptions of the agreements with Malaysia, 
Belgium/Luxembourg and Iceland. However, here we find again a difference with the 
investment chapters in PTAs signed by Chile, as almost all of them, with the sole 
exception of the FTA with Australia do not exclude diplomatic protection. 
As we can see, besides the historical evolution from BITs to PTAs, with newer 
investment chapters in trade agreements generally more long and complex, in the 
majority of the analyzed IIAs, there are no key differences between the agreements 
signed by Chile with “Northern” developed economies in relation to those negotiated 
with other “Southern” developing countries.119 Few differences seem to follow the 
developed/developing divide.  
For example, the only explicit exceptions to the “fork-in-the-road” provisions are 
contained in the BITs with Germany, Belgium/Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, and 
Switzerland where, even if a claim has been presented before the tribunals of the Host 
State, the foreign investor has the possibility to submit the dispute to international 
arbitration if domestic courts have not produced a final substantial decision within 18 
to 36 months, or if the parties agree beforehand.120 Similarly, “umbrella clauses” are 
only found in BITs signed by Chile with developed countries: Denmark, Greece, Austria 
and Netherlands.121   
In another example, the FTAs with Canada and the United States define investor as: 
“investor of a Party means a Party or state enterprise thereof, or a national or an 
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3(4). Denmark, Greece, Austria and Netherlands already had previous BITs with umbrella clauses. See 
Katia Yannaca-Small, supra note 105. 
enterprise of a Party, that attempts to make, is making, or has made an investment in 
the territory of the other Party.”122 This concept has been further clarified only in the 
FTAs with Peru and Colombia, and in the 2010 Chile-Uruguay BIT as meaning “that an 
investor intends to make an investment, when you have made the essential actions 
needed to make such an impression, such as the channeling of resources for the 
establishment of the capital of a company, obtaining permits and licenses, among 
other”.123 However, other investment Chapters in Chilean PTAs do not address this 
particular definition (FTAs with China and Korea) and the FTA with Mexico, having the 
same definition of investor as the FTAs with Canada and the United States, does not 
clarify its meaning, probably because it was negotiated before the FTAs with Colombia 
and Peru. 
The broad definitions of “investment” and “investor” in the Investment Chapters of 
FTAs, considering the possibility of protecting foreign investment even if the transfer 
of funds has not taken place, are a departure of the Chilean Model BIT, which referred 
only to the capital that actually has been transferred from abroad.124  
IV. Chilean Trade and Investment Agreements and Development 
Policies 
Ebert and Posthuma have highlighted a trend among South-South PTAs to gradually 
include some labor provisions.125 In the same line, Gordon and Pohl have reported126 
that language referring to environmental issues is rare in BITs but is becoming 
increasingly common in other IIAs, both in North-South and South-South agreements.  
However, almost none of the 53 Chilean BITs has explicit labor or environmental 
provisions127 and only some of the investment chapters in Chilean PTAs tackle these 
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sustainable development, “stand alone IIAs have not yet begun to provide institutional mechanisms or 
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issues.128 Overall, 14 of the 23 PTAs address sustainable development issues including 
provisions on labor and environment.129  
With respect to PTAs, there is a significant degree of variation in the way sustainable 
development provisions are considered, as some agreements contain detailed 
commitments in this regard, including the creation of joint commissions, cooperation 
procedures and even citizen claims, while others merely refer to labor and 
environmental concerns in the preamble of the treaty. This inconsistency is common 
to treaties signed by Chile both with developed and developing countries, although 
two of the most detailed PTAs with respect to development policies are the FTAs with 
Canada and the United States.  
The very first Chilean FTA was signed with Canada in 1996 that included sustainable 
development and environmental protection as general objectives in the preamble of 
the treaty, and side agreements on labor and environmental cooperation. In labor 
matters, the agreement aims for a high level of national laws in the area of Core Labor 
Standards (CLS), as well as minimum working conditions (hours of work, minimum 
wages and occupational safety and health) and migrant rights, and enforcement of 
national laws in these areas.130 The environmental agreement has as one of its 
objectives, the promotion of sustainable development based on cooperation and 
mutually supportive environmental and economic policies.131 Both agreements include 
the creation of joint commissions for environmental and labor cooperation, and 
mechanisms allowing citizen complaints similar to NAFTA’s Labor and Environmental 
Agreements.132  
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The FTA signed with the United States in 2003, also contains a labor and an 
environmental cooperation mechanism in Chapter 18 and 19, respectively.133 The labor 
chapter outlines a cooperative agenda to promote worker’s rights and an agreement 
that it is inappropriate to weaken or reduce domestic labor protections to encourage 
trade or investment, requiring effective enforcement of domestic labor laws.134 The 
environmental chapter’s main objective is to contribute to the Parties’ efforts to 
ensure that trade and environmental policies are mutually supportive in accordance 
with the objective of sustainable development, highlighting the importance of 
multilateral environmental agreements in this regard.135 However it does not consider 
citizen complaints like in the side environmental agreement with Canada. 
Complementing this framework, the investment chapter includes a commitment to not 
lower standards in order to attract investment.136 A parallel Environmental 
Cooperation Agreement was signed in 2003, establishing a Joint Commission for 
Environmental Cooperation.137   
Similar commitments to lower neither labor nor environmental standards are included 
in the P4 SEPA Environmental Cooperation Agreement and in the P4 Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) on Labor Cooperation. This MOU is particularly important with 
respect to Brunei Darussalam as the parties affirm their commitment to the principles 
of the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up 
(1998), and at the time of the signature of the P4 (2005), Brunei was not yet a member 
State of the ILO.138 Both the FTA with the United States and the P4 do not permit 
citizen submissions but they consider the designation of points of contact to facilitate 
communication in these matters and do allow a State-to-State consultation process.139 
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Sustainable development and environmental protection are also considered as general 
objectives in the preamble of the P4 treaty. 
In the same vein, the SEP Chile-Japan mentions, in the preamble, that the parties are 
convinced that “economic development, social development and environmental 
protection are interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars of sustainable 
development, and that the strategic economic partnership can play an important role 
in promoting sustainable development”. Only one provision of its main text recognizes 
that it is inappropriate to encourage investments by investors of the other Party by 
relaxing its environmental measures.140 However, in Annex 3 of a joint statement 
signed together with the SEP, both governments also declare that it is inappropriate to 
set or use environment laws, regulations, policies and practices for the purposes of 
disguised restriction on international trade. In the same Annex, both countries reaffirm 
their intention to continue to pursue high level of environmental protection and to 
fulfill their respective countries’ commitments under applicable international 
environment agreements, harmonizing environmental laws, regulations, policies and 
practices in harmony with those commitments, and promoting its public awareness. 141 
With respect to labor commitments, in the same Annex 3, both governments reaffirm 
their respective countries’ obligations as members of ILO and their commitment to the 
abovementioned ILO Principles, sharing the view that on the importance of having 
their respective countries’ labor laws, regulations, policies and practices in harmony 
with their countries’ commitments under international labor agreements and of 
promoting its public awareness. Both governments consider inappropriate to set or 
use labor laws, regulations, policies and practices for the purposes of disguised 
restriction on international trade and that is inappropriate to weaken, reduce or fail to 
enforce or administer the protections afforded in domestic labor laws solely to 
encourage trade or investment.  
The Australia-Chile FTA only includes labor and environmental issues as areas of 
cooperation. In labor and employment matters, cooperative activities will be based on 
the concept of decent work, including the principles embodied in the ILO Declaration 
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up.142 Cooperation on 
environment is aimed to strengthen environmental protection and the promotion of 
sustainable development in the context of reinforcement trade and investment 
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relations.143 Similarly, the AA with the European Union just considers an article 
identifying topics of cooperation on environment144 and includes a dedicated provision 
on social cooperation with reference to Conventions of the ILO.145 Both treaties 
consider sustainable development and environmental protection as general objectives 
in their respective preamble. 
The FTA with EFTA only mentions the promotion of “the environmental protection and 
conservation, and sustainable development”, and the improvement of “working 
conditions and living standards”, as part of the preamble of the treaty.  
There is no fundamental change in the treatment of sustainable development issues if 
we review the Chilean PTAs with developing countries, as it also varies from detailed 
commitments to mere policy references, although fewer agreements with Southern 
States include comprehensive obligations in this regard. The FTA signed with Colombia 
has a special chapter on environment (Chapter 18), where the parties reaffirm their 
sovereign rights over their natural resources, and the right to establish their own levels 
of environmental protection, promoting sustainable development and domestic 
policies and laws in harmony with international environmental agreements. In 
addition, the parties recognize that it is inappropriate to use policies, laws, regulations 
and environmental management as a disguised barrier to trade. A special provision is 
included in the investment chapter, declaring that a Party is not prevented from 
adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any measure that it considers appropriate to 
ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to 
environmental concerns.146 
In the same way, the FTA with Colombia has a Labor Chapter (Chapter 17) where the 
parties reaffirm their obligations as members of the ILO and its commitments under 
the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998), and 
recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage trade or investment by weakening or 
reducing the protections afforded in domestic labor laws. In addition, the chapter 
details methods of cooperation between the parties to achieve these objectives. 
A similar approach is taken in the FTA with China (2007) – which preamble consider 
sustainable development and environmental protection as general objectives – and its 
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supplementary Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Environmental 
Cooperation, and in the MOU on Labor and Social Security Cooperation. However, in 
the Labor MOU there is no explicit reference to ILO instruments although cooperation 
areas include decent work, labor laws and labor inspection, improvement of working 
conditions and workers’ training, globalization and its impact on employment, the 
working environment, industrial relations and governance.147 Cooperation issues in the 
environmental MOU include quality of water and air pollution. 148 In Chile-China 
Supplementary Agreement on Investment (2012), it is explicitly recognized that 
“except in exceptional circumstances, do not constitute indirect expropriations 
nondiscriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to 
protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety and the 
environment”.149 
The FTAs signed with Mexico (1998) and Korea (2003) did not include a supplementary 
agreement or a chapter on environment or labor. However, in their preamble 
sustainable development and environmental protection, are considered as general 
objectives, and both treaties include a provision,150 establishing that nothing in the 
investment chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining 
or enforcing any measure that it considers appropriate to ensure that an investment 
activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns. 
In addition, it is recognized that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing 
domestic health, safety or environmental measures. Consequently, a Party should not 
waive or derogate from such measures as an encouragement for the establishment, 
acquisition, expansion or retention in its territory of an investment of an investor. If a 
Party considers that the other has offered such an encouragement, it may request 
State-to-State consultations with a view to avoid any such encouragement. 
In the FTAs with Turkey and Malaysia, the Parties recognize in the preamble the 
importance of strengthening their capacity to protect the environment and promote 
sustainable development in concert with strengthening trade and investment relations 
between them. They also declare that it is inappropriate to set or use their 
environmental laws, regulations, policies and practices for trade protectionist 
purposes. It is also inappropriate to relax, or fail to enforce or administer, their 
environment laws and regulations to encourage trade and investment. In addition to 
that, both PTAs detail some ways of cooperation between the parties to achieve these 
objectives.151 Furthermore, the FTA with Turkey declares that both parties will 
promote decent work, sound labor policies and practices, reaffirming their obligations 
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as members of the ILO and their commitments under the ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up (1998), recognizing that it 
is inappropriate to encourage trade or investment by weakening or reducing the 
protections afforded in domestic labor laws.152 
The FTA Chile-Peru has a lower environmental commitment, only establishing that 
nothing in the investment chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, 
maintaining, or enforcing any measure that it considers appropriate to ensure that an 
investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to 
environmental concerns.153 There are no obligations to not lower environmental 
standards and there are no State-to-State consultations in environmental matters. 
However, the same FTA has a Labor Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) where the 
parties reaffirm their obligations as members of the ILO and its commitments under 
the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998), and the UN 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families (1990).154 
Neither the framework agreement with Central American countries in 1999, nor the 
bilateral protocols with Costa Rica (1999), El Salvador (2000), Honduras (2008), 
Guatemala (2010) and Nicaragua (2012) include labor or environmental provisions.  
The same happens with almost all the ECAs signed by Chile, with the exception of the 
ECA with Bolivia that include a provision to promote cooperation in environmental 
preservation,155 and the ECA Chile-Ecuador that consider in the preamble the creation 
of new employment opportunities, improving working conditions and living standards 
in their respective territories. 
With respect to dispute settlement involving Chilean PTAs or IIAs, there have been no 
inter-state disputes regarding the interpretation or application of the treaty. One of 
the few reported cases of interstate arbitration involving these treaties was initiated 
by Peru pursuant to the Chile-Peru BIT (2000), while a previous investor-State 
arbitration was taking place under the same BIT, between a Chilean investor and the 
Republic of Peru (Peru v. Chile case).156 Based on the existence of the State to State 
arbitration, Peru requested suspension of the investor-State arbitration proceedings 
where it was the respondent, arguing that interpretative priority should be given to 
interstate proceedings.157 Without providing any reasoning behind, the request was 
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denied by the investor-state arbitral tribunal merely considering that “the conditions 
for a suspension of the proceedings were not met”.158 The interstate arbitration was 
pursued no further. 
With the exception of the Vieira v. Chile case,159 investor-State arbitration cases where 
Chile has been the respondent State have not dealt directly with sustainable 
development issues.160 In Vieira, arbitration was brought by a Spanish investor after 
the Chilean government rescinded certain fishing permits on ecological grounds (limits 
on the fishing of hake and conger).161 The claim was rejected by the arbitral tribunal in 
a split decision the tribunal, concluding that the dispute between Vieira and Chile 
regarding the fishing rights in question had already arisen by the time the Chile-Spain 
BIT entered into force.162 
V. Trade and Investment Regulatory Framework and Institutions 
A. Regulatory Priorities and Its Outcome 
Since the 90’s Chile's integration into the world economy has been possible largely 
thanks to a vigorous policy of bilateral trade negotiations, that followed a policy of 
unilateral openness during the second half of the 1980’s. Today the country has 24 
agreements in force with 62 different trading partners, and exports to countries with 
PTAs accounted for 2014, 93% of total shipments, reaching US $ 76,648 million. The 
prospects for future are to continue in the same path, strengthening ties with the 
countries of the Latin American region, like Brazil, Central America and the Caribbean 
(especially with Dominican Republic and Cuba). Other regions identified as important 
are the Eurasian Economic Union, India, China and Africa. Equal importance is given to 
the possible closure of the TPP negotiations, the participation in the Pacific Alliance, 
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and an update of the agreements with the European Union and the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA). 163 
The regulatory priorities behind Chilean investment policy have evolved from the DL 
600 – when foreign investment effectively needed special, both institutional 
framework and stability, to enter the country. Today, the Chilean government 
considers that a regime of exceptionality is not necessary, as the country has a globally 
recognized status, not only as a member of the OECD since 2010, but also because of 
its economic, social and institutional stability. For that reason, DL 600 has been 
repealed and a new regulation is in the making, aimed to create the “right” incentives 
to attract foreign direct investment.164 Following OECD’s recommendations, the idea is 
to offer foreign investors a stable macroeconomic conditions and a non-discriminatory 
legal framework with respect to domestic investors, preventing tax competition 
between countries with the aim of attracting foreign investment projects. The focus 
would be in the promotion of investments into strategic sectors and to those who lack 
investment due to market failures identified properly, guaranteeing access of foreign 
investors market the formal exchange market and the ability to remit the capital value 
of their investment and profits.165 
Although the policy orientation behind the trade and investment regulatory changes in 
Chile, promoting free trade and strong protection to foreign investors, may be 
considered more “right-oriented” than “left-oriented”,166 it is worth mentioning that 
both free trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties concluded by Chile were 
negotiated since early 90’s, in a democratic regime with a coalition in power of center-
left political parties. In fact, since 1990 to 2010, Chile had two Presidents from the 
Christian-Democratic Party and two Presidents from the Socialist Party that kept a 
coherent continuity in the trade and investment policies. 
The strategy of Chile adopted during the military regime of unilateral reduction of 
tariffs and strong domestic protection to foreign investors, during democracy morphed 
into open/additive regionalism and to the promotion and protection of foreign 
investors using international agreements. Chile did not embarked in those changes as 
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responses to international commitments assumed by the country before international 
organizations or aligned to it. This can be considered as an autonomous policy shift, 
responding to the internal reality of the country as Chile, as the option of bilateral or 
plurilateral agreements was deemed the most convenient for Chile, considering its low 
bargaining power in multilateral negotiations and that a continuation of the unilateral 
opening would yield few additional efficiency gains.167 However, this policy did not 
exclude unilateral openness or multilateral negotiations (mainly through GATT-
WTO).168 Chile was an early adopter of these policies in Latin America and its policy 
change was generally not influenced or aligned with movements in other countries of 
the region. One of the most notable exceptions in this regard, is the influence of the 
experience of Mexico in NAFTA that was one of the triggers of the Chilean interest in 
that type of agreements. 
Chile has maintained its position with respect to trade and investment in the 
international economic fora. Evidence of this can be found in its early exit from the 
Andean Community due to differences with respect to the investment policy of that 
bloc, and its overall support of the WTO Agreements, PTAs, BITs and IIAs in general. As 
mentioned, Chile is one of the countries with more PTAs in the world, 169 and a 
relatively high number of IIAs.170 
Chilean trade and investment policies have contributed to growth and poverty 
reduction in the country. In 2013, Chile was ranked 41 out of 187 countries and 
territories in the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI), together with Portugal. 
According to the UNDP, between 1980 and 2013 Chile’s HDI value increased from 
0.640 to 0.822 (28.4 % or an average annual increase of about 0.76%). In the same 
period, Chile’s life expectancy at birth increased by 10.9 years, mean years of schooling 
increased by 3.4 years and expected years of schooling increased by 3.8 years, and 
Chile’s GNI per capita increased by about 168.2%.171  
However, the OECD hast reported that from 1990 to 2004 Chile experienced “high, 
diversified, export-led growth supported by sound macroeconomic and social policies”, 
but also put considerable pressure on some natural resources, notably air quality and 
water availability – particularly in sectors such as mining, forestry and aquaculture.172 
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Although these policies have resulted in significant reductions in poverty, Chile has a 
high income inequality with a Gini coefficient of 0.50, the highest of OECD members.173   
B. Institutions and Actors 
The main Chilean institutions mobilized in the process of promoting the 
abovementioned changes in trade and investment regulation, have been the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs with respect to trade, and the Ministry of Economy with respect to 
foreign investment.   
Regarding trade, two agencies of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs are particularly 
relevant: the Directorate General of International Economic Affairs (DIRECON), and the 
Institute of Export Promotion (Pro-Chile). DIRECON was created by Decree with the 
force of law N° 53 of January 10, 1979 and its mission includes the implementation of 
the Presidential policy on foreign economic relations, promotion and negotiation of 
international treaties and agreements of an economic nature (with the concurrence of 
the Minister of Finance), collaboration into the development of the country's exports, 
and developing public and private sector proposals for the optimum utilization of 
international markets.174 Since its inception, DIRECON has been leading the negotiation 
of ECAs and PTAs and continues to do so.175 An Inter-Ministerial Committee on 
International Economic Negotiations presided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was 
created in 1995,176 in order to harmonize the interests of the different ministries in 
these negotiations and coordinate different negotiations. 177  
Pro-Chile is the Chilean agency in charge of promoting exports of goods and services 
from the country that also contributes to the promotion of tourism. It was created by 
Decree Law N° 740 of November 4, 1974,178 and its mission includes identify business 
opportunities, co-finance participation in trade shows, and provide technical assistance 
to exporters.179 Together with other organizations such as Fundación Chile, Pro-Chile 
has contributed in the success of Chilean exports.180 Today the country stands out 
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worldwide as the largest exporter of blueberries, grapes, plums, prunes, dried apples, 
trout and Pacific salmon.181 
Regarding investment, the Foreign Investment Committee (FIC) is the institution that 
represents Chile in administering legal procedures related to the Foreign Investment 
Statute (including the analysis of investment applications, signing of investment 
contracts and authorization of remittances), provide information concerning foreign 
investment for investors and potential investors, and coordinates the defense and 
representation of the country in cases filed by foreign investors before arbitral 
tribunals.182 The FIC was the leading agency in the negotiation of bilateral investment 
treaties during the 90’s.183 
The Foreign Investment Committee (FIC) was created by Decree Law 600 of July 11, 
1974184 and is formed by the Ministers of Economy (who acts as its president), Finance, 
Foreign Affairs and Planning as well as the president of the Central Bank. Other 
ministers responsible for specific economic sectors are invited to participate in 
meetings whenever is deemed necessary. The FIC is headed and managed by an 
Executive Vice-President who is appointed by the President of the Republic.185 
However, since January 1, 2016 the FIC will be replaced by a new “Foreign Investment 
Promotion Agency” (FIPA), since the DL 600 was repealed by Article 9 of the Law No. 
20780 of September 26, 2014.  A “Transversal Foreign Investment Advisory 
Commission” presented in January 2015 a report on a new institutional framework for 
foreign investment,186 and a project of law establishing FIPA was submitted to the 
Congress the same month, which has been approved by the Chamber of Deputies and 
now is pending Senate approval.187 
Legal professionals played a large role on this process, as represented the large 
number of public servants of the abovementioned Ministries and Agencies involved in 
the design and creation of regulations, as well as trade and investment negotiations, 
together with economists. In that context, domestic and international regulations in 
both trade and investment are closer to the legal tradition of “public” law more than 
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“private” law, as they contain elements of constitutional law, administrative law and 
public international law. 
The participation of private actors in this process was formalized in 1995, with the 
creation of a Committee for the Participation of the Private Sector, within the Inter-
Ministerial Committee on International Economic Negotiations.188 A larger 
participation of the civil society has been considered since 2011, with the enactment of 
the Law N° 20.500 on Associations and Public Participation in Public Administration, 
that considers a more active role of citizens in the creation of public policies and 
regulations, through mechanisms of public information, public consultation and civil 
society councils. 189 
In that context, since April 2014 DIRECON decided to initiate a process of transparency 
and openness of the negotiation of the Trans Free Trade Agreement (TPP), inviting 
various organizations of civil society to join the so-called "Adjoining Room". This is an 
open space for information, dialogue and debate aimed to help to define the positions 
of Chile in the TPP negotiation. It is open to all organizations that have directly 
expressed interest and is open to participation by any domestic interested party, 
whether non-governmental organizations, associations, unions, national academic 
institutions, among others.190 
Due to the recent implementation of these policies on public participation, it is difficult 
to assess the fragilities or weaknesses of these institutional changes, but in recent 
years Chilean society is clearly demanding more information and transparency from its 
government, ensuring that government decision making is not compromised by 
conflicts of interest.191  
VI. Conclusion: Is There a Chilean Pattern of Trade and Investment 
Agreements?  
As we have seen, Chile has adopted multiple approaches to regulate inward and 
outward, trade and investment flows, including unilateral, multilateral and 
bilateral/regional strategies. The main purpose of this paper was to examine if, in 
doing so, Chile has implemented a different approach when negotiating with other 
Southern developing countries when compared with the approach taken in 
negotiations with Northern developed countries.  
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With respect to trade agreements Chile has evolved from a policy of unilateral 
openness to a Latin American regionalism represented by the ECAs signed with ALADI 
members in the early 1990’s. In the middle of the same decade, Chile progressed in 
the implementation of a policy of open or additive regionalism, negotiating Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs) with all its major trading partners, a policy that continues until 
today, without abandoning the multilateralism and its commitments under WTO 
Agreements.  
The main regulatory differences in both Chilean strategies are that ECAs were mainly 
focused on the reduction of tariffs whereas PTAs were more broad and 
comprehensive, including disciplines beyond the trade in goods, such as trade in 
services, intellectual property, and investment, among others. Although ECAs were 
signed only with other “Southern” developing countries, FTAs were not exclusively 
negotiated with developed countries. In fact, after the first Chilean Free Trade 
Agreement – with Canada in 1996 – Chile signed an FTA with Mexico in 1998, and from 
that date, almost every trade agreement has followed the FTA framework or other 
similar structure, regardless of whether it has been negotiated with a developed or a 
developing country.192 However, we find certain differences in PTAs signed by Chile 
that seems to be based on the “developed” or “developing” status of the trading 
partner, especially in fields like market access in the trade of goods, trade in services, 
government procurement, intellectual property, investment and electronic commerce.  
These differences are not exclusive of Chilean PTAs. While PTAs have surged in 
Southern countries as regionalism intensifies and global value chains flourish, 
differences have also been detected in Asian FTAs between Southern countries and 
with Northern States in areas such as tariffs, rules of origin, trade in services, WTO 
notification, and deep integration.193 
Regarding investment agreements, Chile adopted an active policy of negotiating and 
signing BITs in the 1990’s, that included open definitions for investors and investment, 
MFN, national and fair and equitable treatment, and unrestricted access to ISA, full 
compensation for direct and indirect expropriation. A change of policy started in 1996 
with the Canada-Chile FTA that included an investment chapter, and since 2003 Chile 
has not signed more BITs as standalone agreements. From that year, with the sole 
exception of the second Chile-Uruguay BIT (2010), all Chilean IIAs are to be found as 
investment chapters in PTAs. These chapters are longer and complex than BITs, with 
detailed definitions of certain standards, notably Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET), 
Full Protection and Security (FPS) and expropriation (especially indirect expropriation). 
They also include provisions on performance requirements, filter mechanisms, 
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exceptions and carve-outs for certain (notably financial services), and transparency 
rules. Today Chile belongs to a group of Southern countries moving from negotiating 
traditional bilateral investment treaties (BITs) to include investment chapters into PTAs 
like Peru, or Colombia. 
In this field, there are also no major differences if the IIAs were signed with “Northern” 
or “Southern” countries. In fact the majority of BITs and of IIAs signed by Chile 
(including the investment chapters in PTAs), are with developing countries – and the 
first Chilean BIT was signed with Argentina in 1991. Some of the few variances we can 
find are related with the investor-State dispute settlement, where some BITs with 
developed countries include exceptions to the “fork-in-the-road” provisions that are 
contained in the majority of the Chilean BITs,194 and certain investment chapters in 
Chilean PTAs with developing countries have a more restricted definition of 
“investor”195 in relation to similar agreements signed with developed countries. 
In the case of Chile, the impacts of these regulatory strategies in relation to 
developmental policies are clearly different, as neither ECAs nor BITs include 
environmental or labor provisions, or in general related to sustainable development.196 
In the framework of a tendency to include some labor and environmental provisions 
among South-South PTAs, several Chilean agreements include them, although only 
some of them address these concerns specifically in their investment chapter. There is 
a significant degree of variation in the way these provisions are considered, as some 
PTAs include detailed commitments in this regard while others merely mention labor 
and environmental concerns as policy references. If we review the Chilean PTAs with 
developed or developing countries, there is no important change in the treatment of 
sustainable development issues, although two of the most comprehensive PTAs with 
respect to labor and environment are the FTAs with Canada and the United States, and 
fewer agreements with developing countries include detailed commitments in this 
regard, notably the agreements with Colombia and China. 
In general, Chile follows a model of trade and investment agreement that is influenced 
by treaties previously signed by Northern developed countries. With respect to 
investment treaties, both the Chilean Model BIT and the 53 BITs signed by Chile 
generally follow what has been characterized as the “Dutch Model”, that reflects, in 
general, the European approach to investment treaties.197 With some minor variations 
– like the inclusion of “fork-in-the road” provisions, a reduced use of umbrella clauses 
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and the full protection and security standard – Chile used this framework in the 
negotiations of BITs with other developing countries.198 
In the case of trade agreements, the NAFTA Model has clearly served as a blueprint for 
the negotiation of the disciplines contained in later Chilean agreements – especially if 
we consider that the first two FTAs signed by Chile are with NAFTA members (Canada 
and Mexico)199 and there was the explicit intention of becoming part of that trade 
bloc.200 However, Chile has been an actor in the development of the model, as 
evidenced by the investment chapter of the Chile-United States FTA, whose 
innovations on transparency, fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security, 
indirect expropriation, and in general on ISA201 served as an outline for future 
investment chapters in PTAs signed both by Chile and the United States.202 Innovations 
are also found in Chilean agreements with Southern countries. For example, the FTA 
with Colombia was the first negotiated by Chile and a South American country that 
included chapters on government procurement, e-commerce, environment and labor. 
Although the Chilean FTA with Korea (2003) does not include labor provisions, after 
the signature of the Chile-Peru FTA in 2006 (that includes an MOU on Labor and 
Migration cooperation), Peru included a labor chapter in the FTA with Korea (2010) – 
something that had already been included in the FTA signed with the United States in 
2006.203 
Two agreements will be decisive for future developments of patterns in trade and 
investment treaties between Southern countries: the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
and the Pacific Alliance. The TPP currently includes three “developed” countries (New 
Zealand, Singapore and Brunei Darussalam – all members of the P4 together with 
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Chile) but in the negotiations it is being expanded to include new countries, both 
developed (Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United States) and developing (Malaysia, 
Mexico, Peru, and Vietnam).204   
The Pacific Alliance has already an Additional Protocol to the Framework Agreement, 
signed on February 10, 2014, where Colombia, Chile, Mexico and Peru commit to 
liberalize 92% of their trade, with the remaining 8% over the coming years.205 Although 
not yet ratified, this protocol is huge step in regulation of trade and investment 
between these Southern States, as includes the broadest common disciplines ever 
negotiated by these countries: in trade in goods, services, market access, non-tariff 
barriers, rules of origin, trade facilitation, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, 
technical barriers, government procurement, investment, financial services, maritime 
services, electronic commerce, telecommunication, transparency, exceptions, and 
dispute settlement. The chapter on investment includes ISA and provisions on 
corporate social responsibility and on not lowering health, environmental standards 
and other regulatory objectives.  
However, the Pacific Alliance currently does not include an especial chapter on 
environmental or labor issues, although the ones previously signed with Colombia and 
Peru (only in labor issues) are still in force. In recent negotiations, public officials have 
stressed the need to deepen integration, for which they outlined a roadmap that seeks 
soon reach agreements on issues of new generation in areas such as infrastructure, 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), health, intellectual property and financial 
cooperation, among others.206 
The outcome of both TPP and the Pacific Alliance will allow us to assess if the 
regulatory changes implemented by Chile are also replicable in other countries and if 
they can have a spillover effect on the mainstream regulatory patterns. Up to now, 
Peru and Colombia have been the countries of the region that have embraced similar 
regulatory policies to the ones previously advanced by Chile in trade and investment. 
Mexico has been also an early adopter of this type of policies, since becoming a NAFTA 
member in 1992. 
Chile has been successful in increasing both outward and inward trade and investment, 
and it has progressively incorporated provisions addressing concerns on sustainable 
development in its preferential trade agreements. However, a further analysis of the 
effects of these treaty obligations in trade, investment and sustainable development is 
needed to understand why this is happening, as international legal commitments are 
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not necessarily the key factor behind the increase of commerce, foreign investment 
and the improvement of labor and environmental standards.207  
Such a study would be particularly important for Southern economies, as they have 
increased their share in international investment and trade. Since 2012 developing 
countries have become the main FDI recipients208 and FDI outflows from developing 
countries also reached a record level of 39% of the global FDI.209 If in 1980 developing 
countries only accounted for 34% of the world exports, by 2011 their share had risen 
to 47%, nearly half of the global total. South-South trade has been an important factor 
in this, and its share in world trade has increased from 8% in 1990 to 24% in 2011.210 
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